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INTRODUCTION 
 
A principle tenet of Anglo-American jurisprudence is that every person is entitled to the 
“fruit of his labors” unless public policy considerations justify otherwise.1  As a result, the right 
of publicity doctrine has been developed.  This doctrine prevents unauthorized commercial gain 
resulting from the use of an individual’s name, likeness, or persona.2  The right of publicity gives 
the individual the exclusive right to control and profit from the use of their identity for 
commercial promotion.
3
  In order for an individual to bring a claim for damages using the right 
of publicity doctrine, the individual must have achieved “publicity values of substantial 
pecuniary worth.” 4   Most of the time this is only possible if the individual has put in a great deal 
of time, effort, skill, and [usually] even money in order to develop their public image.
5
  
 Previously, the right of publicity has been used to protect humans, but not the likeness of 
non-human characters.  More recently, however, the right of publicity has expanded to protect 
the likeness of sports figures in video games and superheroes in comic books.  Furthermore, 
current law dictates that only a person whose image is appropriated may bring a claim for 
damages under the right of publicity, such as when the appearance resembles a famous human 
personality and is used for commercial gain in a virtual environment.    
This paper will discuss whether avatars in virtual environments have a right of publicity.  
A virtual environment is “an interactive computer simulation which lets its participants see, hear, 
use, and even modify the simulated objects in the computer-generated environment.”6 The 
                                                          
1
Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS 203 (1954). 
2
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (2008) (“[o]ne who appropriates the commercial value of a 
person’s identity by using without consent the person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of 
trade is subject to liability for the relief appropriate under the rules state in §§ 48 and 49”). 
3
 Woodrow Barfield, Intellectual Property Rights in Virtual Environments: Considering the Rights of Owners, 
Programmers and Virtual Avatars, 39 Akron L. Rev. 649, 675 (2005). 
4
 Nimmer, supra note 1. 
5
 Id.   
6
 Barfield, supra note 3, at 649.  
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specific type of virtual environment that this paper will focus on is one kind of massively multi-
player online role-playing game, (“MMORPG”), called Second Life7.  Once a player enters a 
MMORPG, they participate in a variety of activities with other players who are accessing the 
game the same way from all over the world.
8
  A participant in a MMORPG is allowed to design 
a virtual representation of his/her identity, an avatar, which is displayed in the online virtual 
environment.  “Virtual avatars may represent the actions of a user, different aspects of a user’s 
persona, or the user’s social status in the virtual environment.”9  Furthermore, an avatar can take 
on any form, whether a realistic representation of the user who created it, another person’s 
identity, an animal, or a mythical creature.
10
     
Part I will discuss the origins of the right of publicity.  Part II will define the right of 
publicity.  Part III will look at the early cases concerning the right of publicity.  Part IV will 
analyze how courts attempt to balance the rights of publicity versus the right to free speech.  Part 
V will determine whether the right of publicity doctrine may be further expanded to protect the 
likeness of non-human virtual avatars including celebrity “look-alike” avatars and avatars 
created based on another avatar.  Part V will also discuss the choice of law that would likely be 
applied in a right of publicity case brought involving Second Life violations of the right of 
publicity.      
I. The Origins of the Right of Publicity 
The right of publicity did not come to be recognized overnight.  The process took several 
decades, with many improvements over the years.
11
  The first step taken towards the recognition 
                                                          
7
 Second Life, available at http://secondlife.com/?v=1.1 (last visited on February 11, 2010) (Second Life is a free 3D 
virtual world where users can socialize, connect and create using free voice and text chat).   
8
 Barfield, supra note 3, at 650. 
9
 Id. at 651. 
10
 Id.   
11
 J. Thomas McCarthy, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY & PRIVACY, § 1:4 (explains the historical landmarks which led to 
the legal recognition of publicity and privacy rights in a person's identity).   
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of the right of publicity was an article written by Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren titled “The 
Right to Privacy” which discussed the creation of the theory of a broad “right of privacy” 
focusing upon the “affront to human dignity caused by public disclosure of embarrassing private 
facts.”12  Brandeis and Warren were concerned with preserving privacy against a press who 
overstepped the bounds of “propriety and decency” by broadcasting details of sexual relations in 
daily newspapers. The next step was the rejection of common law privacy rights in New York in 
1902 in the Roberson case.
13
 In Roberson, the New York Court of Appeals held that a woman 
had no right to stop the unauthorized use of her portrait captioned by “Flour of the Family,” to 
advertise flour.
14
  As a result of public outcry stemming from the disapproval of this decision, 
New York enacted its first right of privacy law in 1903.
15
  Two years later, in 1905, Georgia
16
 
and then 14 other states began to recognize a common law right of privacy.
17
  These 
developments were the first steps taken to extend the “right of privacy” to the legal recognition 
of the “unpermitted advertising or other commercial use of a person’s identity.”18  The next 
developments included (1) the creation of a “right of publicity,”19 in the 1953 Haelan case and 
                                                          
12
 Id.; see Louis Brandeis & Samuel Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196 (1890). 
13
 Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538 (1902) (a picture of Abby Roberson was plastered over 
town on a flier advertising a baking flour company, which used the picture without permission or compensation. The 
family claimed that the unwanted attention caused the girl severe embarrassment and humiliation. The N.Y. Court of 
Appeals said there was no law against it). 
14
 Anthony L. Pessino, Mistaken Identity: A Call to Strengthen Publicity Rights for Digital Personas, 4 VA. SPORTS 
& ENT. L.J. 86, 98 (2005). 
15
 Id.   
16
 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190 (1904) (the state high court determined that a man had a valid 
invasion of privacy claim against an insurance company for the unauthorized commercial use of his name and 
picture.  This was the first state case to recognize such a right). 
17
 Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, North 
Carolina, Oregon, and Pennsylvania.   
18
 McCarthy, supra note 11.   
19
 Haelan Labs v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953) (a bubble gum manufacturer who had obtained 
contracts with big-league baseball players for the exclusive right to use their names and likenesses in connection 
with the sale of gum or candy sought to enjoin defendant who used these advertising devices in the promotion of his 
candy.  Defendant had argued that the ball players possessed no legal interest in their photographs other than the 
right of privacy, which could not be assigned to plaintiff.  The court stated that, in addition to his privacy right, a 
man has a “right in the publicity of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his 
picture”). 
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(2) the 1954 article by Professor Nimmer which built a legal framework for the “right of 
publicity.”20  The Haelan right of publicity gave a person more than the right to assign an interest 
in his name or photograph.
21
  By allowing a person to make a grant of the publicity value of his 
name or photograph, the Haelan case gave protection to a person’s commercial interest in his/her 
personality independent of his/her privacy interest.
22
  This implied that such commercial interest 
might justify legal protection of an individual against unauthorized use of his name or picture 
aside from any privacy interest.
23
  The court reasoned that although a famous person may 
generally invoke the right of privacy against an advertiser who appropriates his name or picture 
without permission, this right may not always afford adequate protection to his commercial 
interest in his personality.
24
  The reason is because celebrities complaining of the unauthorized 
use of their name or likeness have sometimes been held to have waived their right of privacy 
because of their publicity.
25
  Professor Nimmer’s article identified two policy considerations that 
he believed provide compelling support for the right of publicity: “first, the economic reality of 
pecuniary values inherent in publicity and, second, the inadequacy of traditional legal theories in 
protecting such publicity values”.26 
In 1960 Professor Prosser wrote a law review article in which he broke down all privacy 
rights into four distinct and different torts: (1) intrusion; (2) disclosure; (3) false light; and (4) 
appropriation.
27
  His theory was extremely influential and is not only embodied in the 
Restatement of Torts but has also been uniformly accepted by the courts.
28
  Lastly in the 1970s, 
                                                          
20
 Nimmer, supra note 1. 
21
 Haelan Labs, 202 F.2d 866. 
22
 Id.   
23
 Joseph R. Grodin, The Right of Publicity: A Doctrinal Innovation, 62 Yale L.J. 1123 (1953).   
24
 Id. (citing Haelan Labs, 202 F.2d 866).   
25
 Id.   
26
 Nimmer, supra note 1. 
27
 William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960). 
28
 McCarthy, supra note 11. 
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Congress, in response to various social concerns coined as invasions of “privacy” passed laws 
aimed at problems such as electronic eavesdropping, government computerized record keeping, 
confidentiality of credit and educational records, and intrusive acts by bill collectors.
29
  “These 
statutes illustrate that ‘privacy’ is no longer a single, unified body of law, but rather, it has been 
subdivided into a series of discrete parts, each addressing a specific social concern.”30 
The latest major development in the establishment of the right of publicity doctrine was 
the 1977 case Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.
31
 In Zacchini, the Supreme Court 
provided important recognition that publicity rights are a legitimate economic interest which can 
be recognized by states.
32
  The state’s interest in recognizing a right of publicity is in “protecting 
the proprietary interest of the individual in his act in part to encourage such entertainment.”33  
The Zacchini decision established that state publicity rights were not automatically preempted by 
the First Amendment.
34
   
II. The Right of Publicity Defined 
In the United States, (“U.S.”), the right of publicity exists in twenty-eight states and is 
largely protected by state common, statutory law, or both.
35
  Some states consider the right to be 
a property type right while other states consider it a tort type right stemming from the right to 
privacy.
36
  New York, for example, recognizes it as part of the right of privacy within its civil 
rights law and not a standalone right.
37
  Eighteen states have enacted statutory protections for the 
                                                          
29
 Id.   
30
 Id. 
31
 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
32
 Jon M. Garon, Publicity Rights in Bytes: Contemporary Issues in Entertainment and Sports Law, 11 Chap. L. Rev. 
465, 484 (2008) (citing Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 572). 
33
 Grodin, supra note 23.   
34
 Id.   
35
 Barfield, supra note 3 (internal citation omitted).   
36
 Joel Anderson, What’s Wrong With this Picture? Dead or Alive: Protecting Actors in the Age of Virtual 
Reanimation, 25 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 155, 161 (2005). 
37
 Barfield, supra note 3.     
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right of publicity but these differ on points such as the extent of protection, its application to non-
celebrities, and the available remedies for violations.
38
  The California right of publicity statute, 
Cal. Civ. Code § 3344, has been the most tested right of publicity statute.  The statute states, 
 (a) Any person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, 
photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, 
or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, 
merchandise, goods or services, without such person's prior consent, . . . shall be 
liable for any damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result 
thereof.    
(d) For purposes of this section, a use of a name, voice, signature, photograph, or 
likeness in connection with any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or 
account, or any political campaign, shall not constitute a use for which consent is 
required under subdivision (a). 
 
To establish a common law prima facie case for the violation of the right of publicity, the 
plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) that he is the owner of the recognizable identity 
or a licensee; (2) that the defendant commercially used the identity; (3) that plaintiff did not 
authorize such use; and (4) that such appropriation resulted in economic harm to the plaintiff.
39
   
Early right of publicity cases only recognized a right of publicity of individual celebrities 
because celebrities are more widely known and therefore have more identifiable indicia of 
identity.
40
  Now, the prevailing view is that the right of publicity also extends to non-celebrities 
so long as they can prove a recognizable identity.
41
  Courts, however, are still reluctant to extend 
                                                          
38
 Anderson, supra note 36 (“Indiana offers the broadest right of publicity protection; its statute protects a 
personality’s economic interest in his name, voice, signature, photograph, image, likeness, distinctive appearance, 
gestures, or mannerisms.  California limits its protection to unauthorized usage of name, voice, signature, 
photograph, or likeness.  Kentucky limits its right of publicity protection to unauthorized appropriations of name and 
likeness, while New York protects against the unauthorized use of name, portrait, picture, or voice”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
39
 See, e.g., Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff must 
establish the defendant commercially exploited the plaintiff’s identity without consent to obtain a commercial 
advantage). 
40
 See, e.g., Haelan Labs., 202 F.2d at 868 (professional baseball players had a commercial, proprietary interest in 
their names and likenesses; Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 622 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977) 
(“there is no question but that a celebrity has a legitimate proprietary interest in his public personality”). 
41
 Stacy Allen et al., Non-Human Persons and the Right of Publicity, 
http://images.jw.com/com/publications/1185.pdf (internal citations omitted). 
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the right of publicity beyond individual persons.
42
  They have uniformly denied attempts by non-
human “persons,” such as corporations or institutions, to claim a right of publicity.43   Such 
entities must rely on trademark, trade name, and trade dress law for protection.
44
 
A. Defining Persona 
  
Numerous cases have expanded what constitutes a persona protectable by a right of 
publicity.  The most prominent cases are Pesina v. Midway Manufacturing Co.,
45
 Newcombe v. 
Adolf Coors Co.,
46
 and Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp.
47
  In Pesina v. Midway 
Manufacturing Co., plaintiff Pesina, a martial artist, was hired to model for characters of a coin 
operated video game for the video game manufacturer.
48
  The martial artist’s movements were 
videotaped by a computer and extensively edited.
49
  The arcade game was then licensed to the 
home video market and a home version was created by reformatting the software.
50
  Pesina 
brought an action in Illinois against various game manufacturers for infringement of the common 
law right of publicity based on the unauthorized use of his persona, name, and likeness in the 
home version of Mortal Kombat, Mortal Kombat II, and the related products.
51
   The court stated 
that “[a] plaintiff claiming the infringement of this right must show that, prior to the defendant’s 
use, the plaintiff’s name, likeness, or persona had commercial value.”52  The court granted 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment because Pesina’s name, likeness, or persona lacked 
                                                          
42
 Id.   
43
 McCarthy, supra note 11 at §3:74 (citing University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 
15 N.Y.2d 940 (1965) (education institution not a “living person” under the New York statute); Shubert v. Columbia 
Pictures Corp., 189 Misc. 734 (Sup 1947) (corporation not a “living person” protected by New York publicity law)).   
44
 Id.   
45
 948 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
46
 157 F.3d 686 (9th Cir. 1998).   
47
 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996). 
48
 Pesina, 948 F. Supp.  at 42.   
49
 Id. 
50
 Id. 
51
 Id.   
52
 Id. (internal citation omitted).   
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value prior to the plaintiff’s association with Mortal Kombat and Mortal Kombat II.53   The court 
continued to say, “[a] plaintiff alleging unauthorized use of his likeness must show that the 
likeness was recognizable.”54  The district court found that Pesina offered no evidence to support 
the assertion that his likeness the recognizable while the defendants presented convincing 
evidence that the public did not recognize Pesina in the home version of Mortal Kombat, Mortal 
Kombat II, and the related products.
55
  The defendants showed that after a comparison of Pesina 
and the game character, Johnny Cage, who allegedly resembled the plaintiff, only 6% of 306 
Mortal Kombat users identified Pesina as the model.
56
  As to the defendants’ use of Pesina’s 
name, it appeared only in Mortal Kombat, only for eight seconds, and only when a player won 
the game.
57
  Pesina could have argued that he became so associated with Johnny Cage that the 
character invoked Pesina’s identity, but to prevail on this theory, Pesina would have to show that 
his identity became “inextricably intertwined” in the public mind with Johnny Cage.58  Providing 
such evidence would prove that his right to publicity was invaded by the defendants’ use of 
Johnny Cage.
59
  Pesina could not prove this since the evidence showed that Pesina was neither a 
widely known martial artist nor that the public recognized him as a model for Johnny Cage.
60
  
In Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., Killian’s Irish Red Beer, owned by Coors Brewing Co., 
published an advertisement in a Sports Illustrated “swimsuit edition” that featured a drawing of 
an old-time baseball game.
61
  The baseball scene focused on a pitcher in the windup position and 
                                                          
53
 Id.   
54
 Id. 
55
 Id.  
56
 Id. 
57
 Id.   
58
 Id. 
59
 Id. 
60
 Id. at 42-43.   
61
 Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 689.   
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the background included a single infielder and an old-fashioned outfield fence.
62
  The players’ 
uniforms did not depict an actual team, and the background did not depict an actual stadium.
63
  
Newcombe, a former major league baseball all-star, recognized the pitcher in the ad as himself in 
his earlier days and filed suit.
64
  Among other claims, Newcombe alleged that his identity had 
been misappropriated in violation of California statutory and common law.
65
  Comparing the 
advertisement’s drawing to an old newspaper photograph of Newcombe, the court noted that 
they were “virtually identical, as though the black and white photo had been traced and colored 
in.”66  The minor differences were that the pitcher’s number had been changed from “36” to 
“39,” and the color of the bill of his hat had been changed.67  In finding a genuine issue of fact in 
dispute, the court denied summary judgment for the defendant, and held that the Newcombe was 
identifiable as the pitcher in the advertisement.
68
  The court noted that the drawing in the 
advertisement and the newspaper photograph of Newcombe upon which the drawing was based 
were virtually identical.
69
 The pitcher’s stance, proportions and shape were identical to the 
newspaper photograph of Newcombe; even the styling of the uniform was identical, such as the 
wrinkles in the pants.
70
  The court found that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether Newcombe’s identity was used in the advertisement and reversed the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
71
 
In Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
addressed the issue of whether a person has a right of publicity in their former name.  The case 
                                                          
62
 Id. 
63
 Id. 
64
 Id. 
65
 Id. 
66
 Id.  at 690. 
67
 Id.  at 693. 
68
 Id.   
69
 Id. 
70
 Id. 
71
 Id. at 696. 
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involved a television advertisement General Motors ran during the 1993 NCAA men’s basketball 
tournament which used Abdul Jabbar’s former name without his consent.72 Abdul Jabbar 
contended that this improper use of his likeness violated California’s statutory and common law 
right of publicity in addition to his federal and state trademark rights under Lanham Act, 15 
U.S.C.S. § 1125(a).
73
   
The district court had ruled against Abdul-Jabbar finding that he had abandoned his use 
of the name and therefore General Motors’ use of it could not be construed as an endorsement.74  
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded stating that the “right of publicity protects 
celebrities from appropriations of their identity not strictly definable as ‘name or picture.’”75 The 
Court of Appeals determined that a person retained an interest in their name and that its use in 
advertising still required consent.
76
  
The general rule is that appropriation that does not involve a person’s identity usually 
does not violate publicity rights.
77
  The most common appropriation of identity includes the 
commercial exploitation of a person’s name, voice, likeness, photograph, or signature.78  The use 
of a person’s name nevertheless may not violate that statute if it does not constitute the taking of 
“identity,” but merely uses the name to identify another individual or character in a fictional 
work.
79
  On the other hand, one may violate a person’s common law right of publicity by using 
much more indirect indicia of identity than name, voice, likeness, or signature where the 
appropriation is such that the public is nevertheless able to identify the person whose publicity 
                                                          
72
 Abdul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d at 409.   
73
 Id. at 410.   
74
 Id. at 409.   
75
 Id. at 415. 
76
 Id. at 409.   
77
 Nimmer, supra note 1. 
78
 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3344, 3344.1 & App. B-1 (West 2009). 
79
 Newton v. Thomason, 22 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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rights are infringed.
80
  For example, using a name with other words that evoke the celebrity, such 
as “Here’s Johnny,” or “Velvet Elvis,” can be actionable.81  Also using an individual’s nickname, 
pen name, or stage name can violate the right of publicity.
82
  Furthermore, the use of a celebrity 
look alike in advertising may violate the right of publicity if the use is intended to evoke the 
celebrity’s identity for commercial purposes.83  Use of a “sound alike” singer can also violate the 
original musician’s right of publicity.84  Additionally, use of a unique pose can violate the 
common law right of publicity, even if the individual’s likeness is not used, if the individual is 
readily identifiable by that pose.
85
  Occasionally an actor’s identity will be intertwined with a 
fictional character the actor portrays in the mind of the public.
86
  The characters themselves are 
often independently protected by copyright, and are owned by someone other than the actor 
portraying them.
87
  Commercial exploitation of the character may nevertheless violate the right 
of publicity of the individual portraying the character, even if permission was obtained from the 
copyright owner, if the exploitation elicits the identity of the actor to the public.
88
  However, the 
                                                          
80
 Mark S. Lee, ENTERTAINMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, §3:56 (2009). 
81
 Id. at §3:57 (citing Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983) (use of phrase 
“Here’s Johnny” in connection with a portable toilet violated Johnny Carson's right of publicity); Elvis Presley 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998) (use of “velvet Elvis” to identify a bar and an advertising 
violated rights of Elvis Presley)). 
82
 Mark S. Lee, supra note 80, at §3:57; (citing Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, (S.D. N.Y. 1978) (use of 
nickname “the greatest” to identify Muhammad Ali together with a silhouetted image, violated his right of 
publicity); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379 (1979) (use of “crazy legs” to identify a shaving gel 
violated plaintiff’s publicity rights, because he was well known as “crazy legs” based on his football exploits)).  
83
 Mark S. Lee, supra note 80, at §3:58; (citing Allen v. Men’s World Outlet, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. N.Y. 
1988) (use of Woody Allen look alike in magazine advertisement for clothing store enjoined); Presley’s Estate v. 
Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981) (Elvis impersonator violated right of publicity). 
84
 Mark S. Lee, supra note 80 at §3:59; (citing Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (use of 
“sound alike” singer in advertising violated Bette Midler’s common law rights of publicity). 
85
 Mark S. Lee, supra note 80, at §3:60; (citing Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(drawing of pitcher in pose identical to that of Don Newcombe violated right of privacy even though face not 
visible)). 
86
 Mark S. Lee, supra note 80, at §3:65. 
87
 Id.   
88
 Id.  (citing Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 845 (S.D. N.Y. 1975) (recognizing rights of 
publicity of Laurel & Hardy against use of characters authorized by copyright owner); Chaplin v. Amador, 93 Cal. 
App. 358 (1st Dist. 1928) (actor and movie studio enjoined from imitating the appearance and mannerisms of 
Charles Chaplin's “Little Tramp”).   
12 
 
individual has the burden of proving that the public identifies him or her when they see the 
character rather than simply the character itself, or there is no right of publicity violation.
89
 
B. What Is “Commercial Use?”  
 
Not all uses of a person’s identity violate the right of publicity.  Only those uses which 
qualify as unauthorized commercial use are disallowed.  Generally, advertising, merchandising, 
and exploitative media uses constitute commercial use.
90
 Using an individual’s identity in 
advertising usually violates publicity rights as this is at the core of the right of publicity 
protection.
91
  The most common violation of the publicity right often involves use of some aspect 
of an individual’s identity to advertise a product without the individual’s permission.92 The 
bottom line is that advertising is anything which seeks to sell a product or service.
93
  It can, 
however, be difficult to determine whether a particular use is an advertising use, a media use, or 
both.
94
   
 Furthermore, merchandising uses such as the use of a celebrity’s name or likeness on 
merchandise or memorabilia including but not limited to t-shirts, bumper stickers, coffee mugs, 
computer mouse pads, posters, are generally thought to violate the right of publicity.
95
 
                                                          
89
 Mark S. Lee, supra note 80, at §3:65 (citing Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(actor’s right of publicity was not violated when character he played in motion picture was reproduced in an “action 
figure,” since the physical image was not the same and the public did not identify him from that role); Nurmi v. 
Peterson, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1775 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (court dismissed the right of publicity claim on the ground her 
previous portrayals of a character called “Vampyra” were not evoked by Defendant's portrayal of the character 
“Elvira”). 
90
 Mark S. Lee, supra note 80, at §3:69-3:71. 
91
 Id. at §3:69. 
92
 Id.  (citing Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686 (9th Cir. 1998) (polls in advertising); Onassis v. Christian 
Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup 1984) (look alike in advertising); Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 
1093 (9th Cir. 1992) (sound alike in advertising); Motschenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th 
Cir. 1974) (identifiable object in advertising); White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 
1992) (evocative setting in advertisement); Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620 (2d Dep’t 
1977) (use of “signature sound” in advertising). 
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Additionally, uses of an individual’s image in news media may violate the right of publicity if 
such use is aimed at exploiting the individual.
96
  Such uses, however, raise First Amendment 
issues
97
 which will be discussed later in this paper.   
III. Recent Cases Concerning the Right of Publicity  
 
In Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.,98 Johnny Carson sued the maker and 
marketer of portable toilets dubbed “Here’s Johnny: The World’s Foremost Commodian,” under 
the common law right of publicity claiming that the usage appropriated his signature Tonight 
Show greeting without his permission.
99
 The district court dismissed Carson’s right of publicity 
claim because the maker of the toilets did not use Carson’s name or likeness.100 The Court of 
Appeals felt that the district court’s approach was too narrow.101  The court stated that when the 
celebrity’s identity is commercially exploited, there has been an invasion of his right whether or 
not his “name or likeness” is used.102 Moreover, Carson’s identity may be exploited even if his 
name, John W. Carson, or his picture is not used.
103
  The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
therefore held that the use of the phrase “Here’s Johnny: The World’s Foremost Commodian,” 
was a violation of Mr. Carson’s common law right of publicity.104   
In 1985 in Midler v. Ford Motor Co.,
105
 Ford Motor Company and its advertising agency, 
Young & Rubicam, Inc., advertised the Ford Lincoln Mercury with a series of nineteen 30 or 60 
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second television commercials in what the agency called “The Yuppie Campaign.”106 The aim 
was to make an emotional connection with Yuppies, bringing back memories of when they were 
in college.
107
 Different popular songs of the seventies were sung on each commercial.
108
  The 
agency tried to get “the original people,” that is, the singers who had popularized the songs, to 
sing them.
109
 Where the agency failed, the agency had the songs sung by “sound alikes.” Bette 
Midler, the plaintiff was done by a sound alike.
110
  The “sound alike” imitated plaintiff to the 
best of her ability.
111
  After the commercial was aired, plaintiff and the “sound alike” were told 
by a number of people that it sounded exactly like plaintiff.
112
  Neither plaintiff’s name nor her 
picture was used in the commercial, and the agency had a license from the copyright holder to 
use the song.
113
  Plaintiff sued for the unauthorized use of her voice under the California Civil 
Code § 3344 and the California common law right of publicity.
114
  The district court believed 
there was no legal principle preventing imitation of plaintiff’s voice and granted summary 
judgment in favor of defendants.
115
  On appeal, the court reversed.
116
  The Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit held that “when a distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely known 
and is deliberately imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers have appropriated what is not 
theirs and have committed a tort in California.”117 The court reasoned that plaintiff made a 
                                                          
106
 Id. at 461.   
107
 Id. 
108
 Id. 
109
 Id. 
110
 Id. 
111
 Id. at 461-62.   
112
 Id. at 462.   
113
 Id.  
114
 Id.   
115
 Id.  
116
 Id. at 463.   
117
 Id. 
15 
 
showing, sufficient to defeat summary judgment and that the defendants for their own profit in 
selling their product did appropriate part of her identity.
118
 
In White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.,
119
 Vanna White sued Samsung under the 
California Civil Code § 3344 and the California common law right of publicity for creating an ad 
that included a robot in a blond wig and fancy dress standing on a game show set similar to the 
set used on the television show “Wheel of Fortune.”120  The district court in White relied on the 
Eastwood v. Superior Court to establish the pleading requirements for the common law right of 
publicity cause of action.  Eastwood held that the right of publicity “may be pleaded by alleging 
(1) the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff's name or 
likeness to defendant’s advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) 
resulting injury.”121 The district court dismissed White’s claim for failure to satisfy Eastwood's 
second prong, reasoning that defendants had not appropriated White’s “name or likeness” with 
their robot ad.
122
  The court of Appeals in White agreed with the lower court’s dismissal of the 
statutory right of publicity claim because the robot ad did not make use of White’s name or 
likeness, however, they felt that the common law right of publicity was not so confined.
123
  The 
court of Appeals held that the robot was a sufficient likeness to Vanna White to support a 
common law right of publicity claim,
124
 saying “it is not important how the defendant 
appropriated the plaintiff’s identity, but whether the defendant has done so.”125   
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In 1997, following in the footsteps of the White decision, the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit heard a case similar to White.  In Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc.,126 Host International 
created robotic figures resembling George Wendt’s and John Ratzenberger’s figures and placed 
them in airport bars without their permission.  Wendt and Ratzenberger brought a common law 
right of publicity claim, a statutory right of publicity claim under Cal. Civ. Code § 3344, and a 
trademark infringement action under 15 U.S.C.S. § 1125(a) of the Lanham Act.
127
   The appellate 
court reversed the district court’s ruling which granted summary judgment in favor of Host 
International and remanded.
128
  The appellate court reasoned that summary judgment was not 
appropriate because the degree to which these robots resemble, caricature, or bear an 
impressionistic resemblance to Wendt and Ratzenberger was clearly material to a claim of 
violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 3344.
129
 
IV. The Right of Publicity vs. The First Amendment 
The right of publicity implicates speech because it involves the monitoring of an 
individual’s image, name, or information that appears in the media.130  Therefore, the 
individual’s exercise of the right of publicity may hinder society’s First Amendment right to this 
information.
131
  The key is to balance a person’s right of publicity against society’s First 
Amendment right which entails determining where the boundaries between the right of publicity 
and the First Amendment lie.
132
   
As discussed, the right of publicity is an intellectual property right where a defendant 
may not take, without permission, a plaintiff’s image for commercial use to support the 
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defendant’s message.133  On the other hand, “courts protect the constitutional right to free 
dissemination of ideas.”134  The Restatement of Unfair Competition restricts the right of publicity 
from, “the use of a person’s identity in news reporting, commentary, entertainment, in works of 
fiction or in advertising that is incidental to such uses.”135  It has therefore been necessary for 
courts to balance the right of publicity and speech to make sure that neither a person’s right of 
publicity nor society’s First Amendment right is curtailed.    
In Zacchini, the only right of publicity Supreme Court case, the Court considered whether 
a media company should be allowed to air an entire circus act on an evening newscast, despite 
the objection of the circus performer.
136
  The Court held that although public figures are entitled 
to less First Amendment protection, the First Amendment does not protect the media where it 
attempts to broadcast a performer’s entire performance without his consent.137  The Court 
rationalized that “a performance is the product of petitioner’s own talents and energy, the end 
result of much time, effort, and expense...”138 Thus, the Court held it was necessary to allow 
Zacchini to have control over his own image, even though it meant preventing a television 
newscast broadcast.
139
 
In Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.,
140
 Comedy III brought an action 
against an artist, Saderup, seeking damages and injunctive relief for infringement of the right of 
publicity under former Cal. Civ. Code §§ 990 (now Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3344.1
141
).
142
  Comedy III 
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was the registered owner of all rights to the former comedy act known as the Three Stooges, 
which are now deceased personalities.
143
  Saderup had many years experience in making 
charcoal drawings of celebrities which are used to create lithographic and silkscreen masters, 
which are then used to produce lithographic prints and silkscreened images on T-shirts.
144
 
Saderup created the original drawings and was actively involved in the ensuing lithographic and 
silkscreening processes.
145
  Without securing Comedy III’s consent, Saderup sold lithographs 
and T-shirts bearing a likeness of The Three Stooges reproduced from a charcoal drawing he had 
made.
146
 The California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
147
  The 
Court agreed that by producing and selling these T-shirt products, defendants used the likeness 
of personalities on products, merchandise, or goods within the meaning of the statute.
148
   
The California Supreme Court held that there was no significant transformative or 
creative contribution in defendants’ work.149  It used the concept of transformative fair use from 
copyright law as the foundation for balancing the rights of publicity and speech.
150
  As it 
explained, “both the First Amendment and copyright law have a common goal of encouragement 
of free expression and creativity...”151  Having identified fair use as the framework, the 
California court created a rule for analyzing right of publicity cases:   
when artistic expression takes the form of a literal depiction or imitation of a 
celebrity for commercial gain, directly trespassing on the right of publicity 
without adding significant expression beyond that trespass, the state law interest 
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in protecting the fruits of artistic labor outweighs the expressive interests of the 
imitative artist.  On the other hand, when a work contains significant 
transformative elements, it is not only especially worthy of First Amendment 
protection, but it is also less likely to interfere with the economic interest 
protected by the right of publicity.  As has been observed, works of parody or 
other distortions of the celebrity figure are not, from the celebrity fan’s viewpoint, 
good substitutes for conventional depictions of the celebrity and therefore do not 
generally threaten markets for celebrity memorabilia that the right of publicity is 
designed to protect.
152
 
 
The court in Comedy III continued to say that “[a]nother way of stating the inquiry is whether the 
celebrity likeness is one of the ‘raw materials’ from which an original work is synthesized, or 
whether the depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the very sum and substance of the work in 
question.”153   
The California Supreme Court reaffirmed its approach in Winter v. DC Comics
154
 in 
which the work in question was a comic book.  In the comic book, Texas recording artists, 
Johnny and Edgar Winter alleged that the comics falsely portrayed them as “vile, depraved, 
stupid, cowardly, subhuman individuals who engage in wanton acts of violence, murder and 
bestiality for pleasure and who should be killed.”155  By determining that the use of the redrawn 
figures could be used for the comic books, the California court made clear that most insertions of 
caricatures of celebrities in other literary works would be considered a transformative use 
protected by the First Amendment.
156
  Furthermore, the court added that when the artistic 
expression takes the form of a literal depiction or imitation of a celebrity for commercial gain, it 
is a direct violation of the right of publicity absent any expressive elements beyond the 
appropriation.
157
 
                                                          
152
 Id.  (quoting Comedy III Productions, 21 P.3d 797 at 808). 
153
 Comedy III Productions, 21 P.3d 797 at 808. 
154
 Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003).   
155
 Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d at 476. 
156
 Garon, supra note 32, at 487. 
157
 Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d at 477. 
20 
 
  In contrast to the transformative, fair use analysis adopted by California, an Oklahoma 
court did not incorporate the fair use doctrine when analyzing publicity rights.
158
  Instead, in 
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n,159 the court directly balanced the 
interest of the First Amendment rights against the benefits of protecting publicity rights
160
 by 
looking to the “social purpose” of the use.161  The court held that works parodying and 
caricaturing celebrities are protected by the First Amendment.
162
   In Cardtoons, a baseball card 
company produced comic-book style artwork of baseball players.  The court reasoned that the 
defendant, by poking fun at baseball players, provided, “an important form of entertainment and 
social commentary.”163  To arrive at its holding, the court balanced the “underprotection” and 
“overprotection” of the right of publicity in question.164 According to the court, “underprotection 
of intellectual property reduces the incentive to create; overprotection creates a monopoly over 
the raw material of creative expression.”165 
 In C.B.C. Distribution and Marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 
L.P., et al.,
166
 the court decided whether fantasy sports operators can use professional athletes’ 
names and historical statistics without a license from the players, the players association and/or 
the relevant league.
167
  C.B.C. Distribution and Marketing, Inc., (hereinafter, “CBC”) brought 
this action for a declaratory judgment against Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 
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(hereinafter, “MLB”) to establish its right to use, without license, the names of and information 
about major league baseball players in connection with its fantasy baseball products.
168
  MLB 
counter-claimed, maintaining that CBC’s fantasy baseball products violated rights of publicity 
belonging to major league baseball players and that the players, through their association, had 
licensed those rights to Advanced Media, the interactive media and Internet company of major 
league baseball.
169
   At the trial court level, MLB argued that CBC was violating the baseball 
players’ individual rights of publicity, which are protected under Missouri state law. Although 
the trial court held that MLB failed to establish these state-law rights, the Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit reversed this determination and found that state-law rights of publicity were 
implicated. It further held, however, that First Amendment considerations trumped these state-
law rights since the baseball players’ names and their corresponding statistics used in CBC's 
fantasy baseball games were all readily available in the public domain and therefore should be 
usable by anyone.
170
 Because no one can exercise exclusive control over information in the 
public domain, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of CBC, thus 
allowing CBC to continue using MLB players’ names and statistics without a license.171 
 The CBC court used Zacchini to justify employing a balancing test weighing First 
Amendment free speech concerns against any potential claim Advanced Media may have to right 
of publicity protection.
172
 The CBC court also looked at CBC’s basis for using the identities of 
Major League Baseball players, whether it was for commercial value or for some other 
                                                          
168
 Id. 
169
 Id. 
170
 Id. at 823.   
171
 Id. at 824.   
172
 Gabriel Grossman, Switch Hitting: How C.B.C. v. MLB Advanced Media Redefined the Right of Publicity, 14 
UCLA ENT. L. REV. 285, 305 (2007). 
22 
 
expressive purpose.
173
 The court argued the use of the players’ names was merely for the purpose 
of identifying the statistics necessary for the functioning of the game.
174
 
V. Do Avatars Have a Right of Publicity? 
 
A “virtual avatar” (hereinafter, “avatar”) is often used to describe “the simulation of a 
graphical form representing a particular person in a virtual environment.”175  An avatar is created 
using software and algorithms.
176
   A recent development in avatars is that they are getting more 
intelligent.
177
  Avatars are capable of performing many tasks such as writing poetry, playing 
chess, composing music, and exemplifying a range of emotions and facial expressions.
178
   
There are a couple of applications of the right of publicity in the context of avatars.  The 
most common application is the creation of an avatar based on a real celebrity.  This application 
is the easiest for recognition of a right of publicity claim.  Another application is the creation of 
an avatar based on another avatar.  The analysis for the latter application is trickier as will be 
discussed below.  Common to both applications, however, is the question of whether the avatar 
needs to show financial game from its publicity in order to have a valid right of publicity claim.   
Another important consideration when considering a right of publicity claim based on 
Second Life is the choice of law that will apply.  Will Second Life’s Terms of Service govern, 
meaning that California’s right of publicity law will control, or will it be based on where the 
players reside?  Additionally, what if a celebrity wants to bring a right of publicity action 
because an avatar is misappropriating his/her likeness, will Second Life’s choice of law clause 
govern or can the celebrity bring a claim in the state he/she resides? 
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A. Celebrity “Look-Alike” Avatars 
A celebrity has a right to prevent people from using his or her image by bringing a right 
of publicity claim. Therefore, if an avatar was created which resembled the image of the 
celebrity, it would probably be treading on the celebrity’s rights.  In the event of a suit, the 
avatar’s owner would have a possible defense.  The owner could claim that the images are 
sufficiently artistic and interpretative to give them First Amendment protection as artistic works.  
Although the First Amendment does provide some protection, commercial speech is entitled to 
less protection than other kinds of speech and therefore the burden would be on the owner to 
prove that the use was not for a commercial purpose.  
B. Creation of an Avatar Based on Another Avatar 
If the copied avatar is famous because it was created by a famous person then only the 
famous person will be able to bring a right of publicity claim.  However, if the copied avatar is 
itself a celebrity and the creator of the avatar has no celebrity of his own apart from that of the 
avatar then the analysis is more complicated.  Imagine the avatar has become so famous that 
people in both Second Life and the real world recognize its identity or indicia of identity such as 
name, voice, likeness, or signature. Will the avatar be able to stop the unauthorized commercial 
use of his identity or indicia of identity?  What if a voice sound-alike or look-alike of the avatar 
was used?  Will the avatar be able to bring a right of publicity claim in a real-world court or in 
Second Life? If we were discussing an individual, the individual would be allowed to bring a 
claim in a real-world court.  The issue, however, is that an avatar is not an individual.
179
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Since the right of publicity is largely protected by state common, statutory law, or both, 
the avatar would not be able to rely on any one body of law.
180
  Furthermore, since most state 
statutes currently only recognize a right of publicity for individuals, unless the statute 
specifically excluded an avatar, we would have to determine whether an avatar could be 
classified as an individual.  The logical analysis may be that since an avatar does not look like a 
living person and is not a living person it should not be characterized as an individual and should 
therefore not have a right of publicity.   
Some courts, however, have ruled that likeness is not a requirement which may leave 
open the possibility that an avatar may one day have a right of publicity.  The key case here is 
Motschenbacher v. Reynolds,
181
 which examined whether under California state law the use of a 
distinctively marked car in a commercial infringed a driver’s right of publicity.182  Plaintiff 
Motschenbacher was an internationally known professional driver of racing cars who was 
recognized in racing circles and by racing fans.
183
  He derived part of his income from 
manufacturers of commercial products who paid him for endorsing their products.
184
  Plaintiff 
consistently “individualized” his cars to set them apart from those of other drivers.185  In 1970, 
defendants, R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company and William Esty Company, produced a 
commercial which utilized a “stock” color photograph depicting several racing cars on a 
racetrack.
186
  Plaintiff’s car appeared in the foreground, and although plaintiff was the driver his 
facial features were not visible.
187
 Plaintiff Motschenbacher appealed from the district court’s 
order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants in his suit seeking injunctive relief and 
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damages for the alleged misappropriation of his name, likeness, personality, and endorsement in 
nationally televised advertising for Winston cigarettes.  
The Court of Appeals agreed with the district court in that the plaintiff’s “likeness” was 
itself unrecognizable; however, it felt that the court’s further conclusion of law that the driver 
was not identifiable as the plaintiff was erroneous in that it failed to attribute proper significance 
to the distinctive decorations appearing on the car.
188
 The markings were not only peculiar to the 
plaintiff’s car but they made some persons think the car in question was the plaintiff’s and to 
infer that the person driving the car was the plaintiff.
189
  The holding of this case may suggest 
that an individual would have a right of publicity if the avatar is identifiable as the individual.  
Whether an avatar that is identifiable with another avatar has a right of publicity is a question 
that has yet to be answered.   
Although current case law does not extend to non-human personas, there have been a 
number of cases which have left open the possibility that avatars may one day have a right of 
publicity.  For example, the White decision involved the use of a robot in a blonde wig and fancy 
dress standing on a game show set similar to the “Wheel of Fortune.”190  The court rejected 
Samsung’s parody defense because the ad’s spoof of Vanna White was not its primary purpose; 
the main purpose was to sell Samsung VCR’s.191   This case leaves open the possibility that if 
avatars were to receive legal rights, the use of an avatar which exactly resembles another avatar, 
even if part of its purpose is for parody, could be actionable if the other elements of the right of 
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publicity are met.
192
  Moreover, the White case implies that a virtual avatar could be found to 
have violated the right of publicity of a human.
193
  
Another case that may be important for virtual avatars involved a sound-alike of the 
actress and singer Bette Midler in Midler v. Ford Motor Co.
194
  The Ninth Circuit found that use 
of the sound-alike in a commercial was a violation of Midler’s right of publicity. 195  According 
to this case, a virtual avatar should not copy the voice of a famous person because this would 
probably be a violation of the person’s right of publicity.196  Furthermore, if an avatar has legal 
rights, a court can find a right of publicity violation if an avatar’s voice was copied assuming that 
the avatar’s voice was used for commercial gain and so long as the voice had prior commercial 
value and was recognizable.   
An important case for virtual avatars is Eros v. John Doe since it was the first case were a 
player claimed copyright and trademark infringement by another player, of a product which was 
created in Second Life specifically for use in Second Life.
197
  Although this case did not deal 
with the right of publicity issue, it did acknowledge that avatars may have rights and may bring 
claims in a real-world court for violations that occur within Second Life.  The parties, however, 
settled the case before the courts were given the opportunity to decide the legal issues, such as 
whether virtual goods used wholly within a virtual world are indeed goods as legally defined, 
and therefore have the rights that are attached to goods.
198
  In an amended complaint, Eros 
claimed John Doe had been making and selling illegal copies of the adult-themed virtual objects 
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(SexGen Platinum Base Unit v4.01 and the SexGen Platinum+Diamond Base v5.01) to other 
Second Life residents in violation of Eros’ exclusive copyrights.199 
If Second Life had virtual laws and courts then an avatar would be able to bring his/her 
right of publicity claim within Second Life
200
   The issue, here, however, is that the avatar would 
have a potential remedy within Second Life but not in the real-world, so if the avatar’s likeness 
was commercially used by someone in the real-world the avatar would have no recourse against 
the infringer since most states currently do not allow a non-individual to bring a claim for right 
of publicity.    
The difficulty in assigning rights to avatars is that an avatar is nothing more than code.  
The avatar does what the person at the computer commands him/her to do.  The avatar is not 
capable of acting on its own and therefore should not be recognized as a person and afforded the 
rights of a person.  Unless an avatar becomes intelligent enough where it can act on its own, 
states will not recognize avatars as deserving of the right of publicity.  Additionally, as virtual 
avatars gain intelligence and create works independently of the user controlling them, significant 
legal and policy issues will arise.
201
  Courts will need to decide what legal rights should be 
afforded to avatars and how far these rights should extend.   
Even if an avatar could bring a right of publicity claim, the avatar would first need to 
show that the infringer gained financially from its publicity.  This factor, however, depends on 
the statutory law defining the right of publicity.  As an example, California’s right of publicity 
statute states that a violation of the right of publicity includes “the commercial exploitation of a 
person’s name, voice, likeness, photograph, or signature.”202  
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C. Choice of Law 
Before entering Second Life a user must agree to a set of terms called the “Terms of 
Service” (“ToS”).203  A key provision in the ToS is the “Governing Law” clause which tells the 
users which state’s or country’s law will be applied if there is a dispute about the contract.  
According to Second Life’s “Governing Law” clause, the choice of law will be California law.204  
Another important clause is the Choice of Forum clause which refers to the geographic region 
where the complaint must be filed, and where the arbitration or trial will be held to decide any 
dispute.  Second Life’s Choice of Forum clause, called “Forum for Disputes” states that the 
venue shall be the City and County of San Francisco, California except as provided in the 
optional arbitration section which is for all matters under $10,000.
205
  This means that for all 
matters over $10,000 the venue shall be the City and County of San Francisco, California.
206
  
  Several scenarios concerning Second Life’s choice of law should be examined: (1) a real 
life celebrity sues a Second Life user who has given his/her avatar an appearance, voice, etc. that 
resembles the celebrity and which is being used for commercial gain; (2) where one user has an 
avatar who has become a celebrity in Second Life and another user whose avatar infringes on 
that celebrity; and (3) a celebrity avatar and a real world Infringer.  
Online worlds are generally hosted at a central location and serve a widespread user 
base.
207
  Although no case has tested a Choice of Law provision of a virtual world or game yet, 
courts have generally upheld provisions where similarly positioned companies (AOL, Dell, 
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Gateway, etc.) imposed Choice of Law provisions choosing the law of their state of 
incorporation or headquarters.
208
  Since Second Life’s Governing Law provision provides that 
California shall be the choice of law, any dispute between a user and Second Life will likely be 
governed by that provision and so California law will apply regardless of where the user resides.  
Although the user may argue that this provision is unreasonable this argument will probably not 
prevail. 
 If, however, a non-party decides to sue a user for violation of the right of publicity or a 
celebrity avatar sues an infringer, the analysis becomes more difficult because SecondLife’s ToS 
will not apply.  In these instances, right of publicity claims will be governed by the substantive 
law of the plaintiff’s domicile because rights of publicity constitute personalty.209  Furthermore, 
if the state whose law must be applied has not yet determined the scope of the common law right 
of publicity in that state, then the court must predict what the courts in that state would rule as to 
the contours of a right of publicity.
210
  An example of how the domicile principle has played out 
in a right of publicity action is the case Shaw Family Archives Ltd v. CMG Worldwide
211
.  In 
Shaw Family, plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring that Marilyn Monroe was domiciled in New 
York, not California, at the time of her death.
212
  If she was, defendants would “hold no right to 
publicity in Ms. Monroe’s image, because New York did not at the time of Monroe’s death, and 
does not today, recognize a posthumous right to publicity.”213  The court held that defendants 
were judicially estopped from asserting that Monroe was anything other than a New York 
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domiciliary at the time of her death and that plaintiffs were thus entitled to summary judgment 
on their claims relating to the photographs.
214
   
 What happens if the person who wants to bring the right of publicity claim resides 
overseas? Does this person have any right of publicity rights in the U.S?  It would seem that a 
non-U.S. resident should have no protected right of publicity in the U.S.  Courts have found that 
for a foreign plaintiff it will be important to consider where the plaintiff has developed and 
exploited his right of publicity through licensing agreements, assignments or merchandising 
schemes.
215
  Therefore, even if the plaintiff resides abroad, as long as he/she has exploited 
his/her rights in the U.S., the state in which this exploitation occurred will be the state whose 
right of publicity law is applied.
216
  For example, in Bi-Rite Enterprises, Inc. v. Bruce Miner Co., 
the plaintiff members of the groups resided both in the U.S. and abroad but they all exploited 
their rights in the U.S. through licensing agreements with Artemis, Inc. and Bi-Rite.
217
 
Therefore, the court concluded although all of the members lived in Great Britain, the law of 
Georgia governed the rights of Judas Priest, Iron Maiden, and Duran Duran since their 
merchandising representative was located in Macon, Georgia and was responsible for policing 
and protecting the use of the groups’ names, logos, and likenesses.218  
As for Choice of Forum clauses, many people have challenged these clauses, and the 
results vary.
219
  Some courts have allowed companies with central distribution of products to a 
world-wide consumer base to require lawsuits to be filed near their home bases, but some cases 
have also gone the other way.
220
   At the very least, if a user attempts to bring a claim outside the 
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specified choice of forum as provided by the ToS, Second Life will likely move to dismiss the 
case since it was filed in another jurisdiction.
221
    
CONCLUSION 
 
Currently, the right of publicity protects famous individuals from having their identity 
appropriated by both real-world and virtual world designers.  In the future, it may be possible for 
an avatar to bring a right of publicity claim if the avatar’s visual appearance or voice is copied, 
assuming the avatar has gained celebrity status, and the copied avatar is used for commercial 
gain.   
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